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Karl Barth’s hermeneutic legacy prolonged Western C hristian 
tradition, especially influenced by Hegelian philos ophy of history. This 
led to Barth’s “theological exegesis” instead of a historic-critical 
exegesis. In a preceding article Barth’s understand ing of the notion 
“hermeneutic circle” is discussed against the backg round of the 
Enlightenment and its counter-movement in Romantici sm. In this 
article Barth’s attitude to the place and role of h istorical criticism is 
explained in light of his dialectic distinction bet ween “scientific” and 
“practical” interpretation. The article aims to sho w that Barth, with his 
dialectics, continues Schleiermacher’s realism. In conclusion, the 
positivistic traits in the Barth legacy are raised once again, in order to 
open the door to Jürgen Habermas and other deconstr uctionist 
thinkers of the postmodern era in hermeneutics. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION – A REAWAKENING OF HISTORICAL 
CONSCIENCE 
As a result of the influence of the Aufklärung it is clear that a trajectory was 
developing which would later be called dialectical theology, in contradistinction 
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to liberal theology. Not only did the philosophers Hegel2 and Kant3 play 
important roles in this development, but so too Dilthey4 and Heidegger.5 
Dilthey’s hermeneutic reflections6 covered a much wider perspective than those 
of Schleiermacher. It had as its starting point in his resistance to the empirical 
approach to history, which intended to study historical phenomena in the same 
way as the natural scientist did with natural phenomena. This approach regards 
history merely as cause and effect, and does not have an eye for the 
uniqueness of historical phenomena. In contrast to this, Dilthey envisaged a 
science of history which would take uniqueness into account; and he wanted to 
accomplish it with a criticism of historical reason. Dilthey states that historical 
phenomena and the human manner of being are not determined by laws but are 
the uncompleted, unpredictable process of becoming over time. He calls this 
manner of being life, but in the sense of a spiritual creative urge and creative 
force, not of a biological process. It concerns the life experiences (Erlebnisse) 
through which people decide for themselves what the meaning of their existence 
is. 
 Life experiences constantly press for expression in external forms. They 
are products of culture in contradistinction to processes of nature. As products of 
culture, they are the bearers of meaning by means of which life interprets itself. 
And owing to their durability, they are accessible not only to contemporaries but 
also to people of later times. As bearers of the meaning of life, they have a 
communicative function: they want something to be understood. The pursuit of 
knowledge in respect of similar phenomena should be aimed at the quality of 
their meaning and the manner of knowing is that of understanding. Therefore, 
according to Dilthey, the manner of knowing regarding historical phenomena is 
that of understanding in contrast to explaining which is the manner of knowing 
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regarding natural phenomena. Natural phenomena can be deduced; but in 
contrast to this, experiences of meaning occur in a non-deducible manner in 
time. 
 In his hermeneutics Dilthey also asks how understanding is possible and 
how it can lead to scientific knowledge. To him the possibility that understanding 
can be a problem relates to the nature of historical consciousness. On the one 
hand, historical consciousness is characterised by an involvement in historical 
tradition, by what addresses us from the past, and on the other hand, by an 
experience of strangeness. In other words, we do not accept everything as 
obvious. The strangeness pertains to the distance in time, and due to this 
strangeness, a deliberate and conscious attempt to understand is needed. This 
requires a step back to the time and a reconstruction of the circumstances and 
spiritual milieu of the time in which the cultural product originated. 
 Authentic understanding is the Nach-erleben (after-experience) of an 
original Erlebnis (life experience). But it is always simply a Nach-erleben and is 
never identical to the original experience. Those who “understand” can indeed 
place themselves in the original situation, but they never detach themselves 
from their own situation, so that they always understand from the perspective of 
the latter. Only in this way can the strangeness be overcome and will 
understanding not be a mere repetition of the original. That understanding is 
possible, is situated in the time-spanning universality of life’s movement. It is the 
same principle of life which found expression then, and now makes a re-
experience possible. Historical knowledge is therefore possible thanks to the 
similarity of knower and known as revelations of the same maxim of life. 
 Dilthey defined interpretation as an artful (kunstmäßige) understanding of 
permanently fixed expressions of life, and hermeneutics as artistic theory 
(Kunstlehre) of the understanding of written, fixed expressions of knowledge. 
Like Schleiermacher, he also used the divinatory as point of departure. He 
believed the divinatory to be based on the genious of the interpreter, a talent 
which rarely occurs. Since interpretation is also practised by the less talented 
and has to be learned by them, it is essential that the art of gifted interpreters as 
laid down in their method, should be retained in the rules of interpretation. But 
gifted interpreters, the actual interpreters, are high above the rules of 
interpretation. They succeed in re-experiencing alien spiritual conditions. 
Through good fortune they succeed in understanding the singular, the 
historically once-only, which they have to elevate to objectivity. With great luck 
they can (vermag) experience a repeated enjoyment of the magical power 
(Zauber) of bygone cultures. The divinatory therefore consists of post-feeling, 
post-understanding, post-enjoyment, in the sense of re-experiencing life’s 
expressions. 
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 Dilthey claims that this is why understanding means to recognise from 
signs observable through the senses something psychic, of which these signs 
are invariably the expression. The objectivization of life, which as spirit 
expresses itself primarily in texts, has to be translated back by means of 
understanding into the full, total liveliness of the interpreter. Historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit) takes place in two phases: life creates objectivizations of 
itself; the objectivizations are translated back into full, total liveliness. 
 As the winning points of Dilthey’s approach, it is pointed out that he tried 
to make historical consciousness comprehensible in terms of hermeneutic 
experience. This cuts both ways: on the one hand, he tried to show the way in 
which the so-called crisis of historism could be overcome. He showed, namely, 
that history is not about bygone states of affairs which have no validity or life-
orienting relevance for people in the present. This also entails that human 
beings cannot approach the expressions of meaning in history as uninvolved 
observers who merely establish and explain facts, but only as people who are 
addressed by history and are opening themselves to the acknowledgement and 
deciphering of a cognitive claim to meaning. On the other hand, he showed that 
the problem of understanding not only concerns interpersonal communication 
through the medium of language, and that the attempt to understand is not only 
aimed at avoiding misunderstanding in the communication process. What it is 
about, is that “readers” as agents of interpretation are addressed inwardly in 
their historicity through their cultural heritage, and that they must and can 
decipher this claim with a view to deepening and enriching their own existence 
in the present. Another winning point of Dilthey’s approach is his insight that 
understanding occurs in the context of history. This means that it is always 
relative to the situation in which interpreters find themselves and that that which 
is to be understood, can only be authentically understood when the 
“understander” is addressed by it in her or his situation. The implication of this 
insight is that interpretation can never be final but invariably has to be 
undertaken anew in every new situation. 
 The misgivings include the fact that Dilthey sees the attempt to 
understand primarily as the bridging of the time-distance between past and 
present. He, therefore, remains trapped in Schleiermacher’s conception of 
understanding as a reproduction of an original production. The question is 
whether the time-distance can or should be bridged. If the time-boundedness of 
the act of interpretation is taken really seriously, bridging the time-distance must 
be regarded as fundamentally impossible. The understanding subject can never 
place himself or herself back in time to be truly “contemporaneous” with the 
original situation of what is attempted to be made intelligible. What was 
experienced in the past, can only be understood as it addresses the potential 
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“understander” in the “present”. To understand the same, it must be understood 
differently. The distance in time should rather be seen as a positive prerequisite 
for understanding because it makes one aware of the strangeness. 
 Interpretation is not a reproduction of the original production. It is rather 
the re-capturing of a meaning which was once upon a time expressed, in order 
to be actualised in the present. Authentic understanding is not only 
interpretability, but also the applicability of expressed meaning. Application is not 
a coincidental and non-essential element of the interpretation process, but 
belongs to the essential structure of interpretation, due precisely to the futuristic 
dimension of all meaning. 
  
5. A RECONNOTATION OF THE “HERMENEUTICAL 
CIRCLE” 
The transition from Schleiermacher to the twentieth-century theologians Barth 
and Bultmann goes hand in hand with the continuum in philosophical thinking 
between Kant, Dilthey, and especially Heidegger.7 For Heidegger the 
hermeneutic problem is primarily an ontological theme. For him it is about the 
philosophical question relating to the reality of actual phenomena, that is to say, 
the being of the beings. It is about the question of how human beings can 
understand and interpret what is made plain by all real phenomena. 
 Moreover, saying that interpretation or understanding is an ontological 
theme means that interpretation itself is a way in which reality appears. 
Interpretation is namely constitutive for human beings’ manner of existance. 
People show their real reality as being therein that they interact knowingly or 
interpretatively with reality, their own reality as well. They appear to themselves 
fundamentally as “readers” but also to the whole of the reality that gives 
something to be understood to them. What actual phenomena make plain to 
them, is their “reality” or “being”. And so people also make their own reality plain 
to themselves. 
 Heidegger’s hermeneutics is an attempt to shed light on the conditions 
for the possibility of understanding as a manner of being in human existence. He 
uses the term Dasein to indicate human existence, a term which usually means 
“being there” but which he reserves for human existence. Dasein wellnigh 
means “human being”, because it characterises the human mode of existence in 
contrast to that of worldly objects such as stones, chairs, and so forth. As 
                                                     
7 Cf inter alia F Hohmeier (1964), Das Schriftverständnis in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns; 
W Schmithals (1967), Die Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns: Eine Einführung; W Stegemann 
(1978), Der Denkweg Rudolf Bultmanns: Darstellung der Entwicklung und der Grundlagen 
seiner Theologie; J Painter (1987), Theology as hermeneutics: Rudolf Bultmann’s 
interpretation of Jesus; M Evang (1988), Rudolf Bultmann in seiner Frühzeit.  
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Dasein, a human being may not even be seen by psychology as an “object of 
study”. Therefore, to Heidegger the use of this concept concerns people in their 
“subjectivity”, the “place” or “space” in which the being is present. But this 
presence is not static. It happens. It is an event in which being happens, in 
which it arrives at a there. 
 This event has two sides. On the one side, Dasein is the event in which 
the being shows or reveals itself. On the other side, Dasein is also the event of 
the unfolding of the being-in-the-world. It is the indication of meaning or 
interpretation of the being. It is the act in which the being which makes itself 
plain, is indeed also understood. Furthermore, the being which makes itself plain 
in the being-in-the-world (= Dasein), is first and foremost itself the being of the 
being-in-the-world. That is why the understanding of this being is before all else 
a self-understanding. As self-understanding, the being-there is the event of self-
actualisation, in other words the putting into effect of the being’s own reality. 
 The event of understanding is temporary in the sense that it cannot be 
completed. And there are two aspects that are apparent from this 
impermanence. Firstly, the understanding of the being has the character of 
design: the creative giving of form to and projection of the possibility of being 
which is not yet being, but could be. The being is therefore primarily understood 
as a “could-be” (Seinkönnen). The term “design” emphasises the non-derivable 
historicity of the event of understanding. Understanding is not the discovery of 
already-given talents or natural potentialities. It is the designing of possibilities 
for self-actualisation which only originate in the design thereof. As design, 
understanding takes place in a free, indeterminate decision. It is a contingent 
and non-derivable act. In the free design, people allow their own being to accrue 
to themselves as a possible being. In this way a future dimension is created, and 
understanding as design exceeds that which is given in the present as already 
actualised, as factuality. The future is opened and the being makes itself 
subsequently plain. The future is therefore an essential condition for the being to 
achieve actualisation, for the being to become meaningful and to reveal the 
sense of being. For this reason, the being becoming meaningful and the 
revelation of its sense, can in principle not be completed. 
 Secondly, the free design of possibilities takes place from a field of 
realised possibilities: people’s past as having been, over against their past as 
irrecoverable pastness. This “having been” is the factual situation into which 
they are cast, and in which they landed without their own doing. People are 
interested in their “having been”, their history, owing to the already interpreted 
sense of being handed down to them (by tradition). Understanding as casted 
design is inextricably linked to the "having been" of people, and as casted 
design it is future-oriented. Understanding people are namely interested in their 
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origins owing to their concern about their future. Therefore, understanding is the 
design of future possibilities based on people’s factual situation. 
 Before Heidegger, the concept “hermeneutic circle” was understood as 
the movement from the part to the whole of the text, and vice versa. But for 
Heidegger it was a cycle of Vorverständnis and Verstehen. In terms of this, the 
conviction is held that understanding never begins at a zero point. Being able to 
understand presupposes that understanding already occurred. This is only 
possible from a given horizon of meaning, which Heidegger calls 
Vorverständnis. However, the given Vorverständnis is exceeded and also 
changed through understanding. The “Vorverständnis” conditions the 
interpretation but does not determine it. 
 Vorverständnis is a social phenomenon, because it concerns a body of 
understanding which one shares with other people. This shared world is 
constituted by an already interpreted sense of being or already realised 
possibilities of being in respect of which a community of people have reached 
consensus. This consensus comes into being through language. People speak 
the same language about the sense of being and therefore Vorverständnis is at 
the same time also Einverständnis.  
 Understanding implies self-interestedness, the decision a single person 
makes in his or her striving for self-actualisation. This decision for new 
possibilities of being is on the one hand determined by the communal horizon of 
meaning, and on the other it constantly presses toward sharing with the fellow 
human being. And because Dasein is always also Mitsein, the sense of being 
that is articulated in interpretation is not a sense of being for-me-only, but it 
gains its hallmark of authenticity only when it becomes a shared sense of being. 
The medium of this sharing is inter-human discourse. It envisages a new 
Einverständnis which in turn functions as Vorverständnis for a new Verstehen. 
 In conclusion, Heidegger states that language is the dwelling of the 
being. As the dwelling of the being, language is living speech as it functions in 
the continuing inter-human discourse. The continuing inter-human discourse, 
with all its tension and mutual conflict, is a structural precondition for the sense 
of being’s becoming meaningful and being revealed. 
 
6. A REINFORCING OF EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION 
The Karl Barth legacy cannot be understood unless it is also weighed against 
the background of Rudolf Bultmann’s (1884-1976) hermeneutic programme. 
There is no doubt that in many respects, Bultmann’s hermeneutics had a 
profound and, for many, an unsettling effect on the theology and the 
hermeneutic thinking of the twentieth century. Bultmann based his 
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hermeneutics, although also with certain deviations, on the existential 
philosophy of Heidegger. 
As we saw above, Heidegger focused on the phenomenon of human 
existence or being-in-the-world (Dasein) and he defined understanding as the 
ability to gain a comprehension of your own possibilities of existence in the 
context of the life-world in which you exist. However, this understanding not only 
concerns the situation in which people find themselves at a specific moment but 
also their possibilities of existence in the future. In the footsteps of Heidegger’s 
theory of understanding, Bultmann posits that it is essential for exegetes to 
consider Biblical concepts critically if they want to introduce the Bible itself as a 
telling power in the present, in the human existence of the here and now. 
Similar to Barth, Bultmann also believes that conquering historism in the 
interpretation of the Scriptures is of cardinal importance in hermeneutics. As 
mentioned above, especially seen as a result of Dilthey’s insights, Bultmann 
also held the conviction that historical investigation does not, as is the opinion of 
historism, consist of the presuppostionless rendering (reconstruction) of the 
past, but that consists of an epistemological confrontation with history which is 
attuned to a decision. 
The important question for Bultmann is: how can the texts handed down 
through the ages, in view of their historicity (their ties to the historical situation in 
which they came into being) address people existentially today? Since the Bible 
is a historical document, the historical question for Bultmann is an inescapable 
assumption for the investigation of the texts. Exegesis, as the interpretation of 
these texts, is a historical science and this investigation can only be done 
objectively, in other words in a presuppositionless manner. Since the results of 
historical research can never be regarded as concluded, however, historical 
research cannot yield results that have absolute validity. As bare historical facts, 
the Biblical data are subject to historical investigation and are not generally valid. 
But as addresses to human beings, it is different. 
Bultmann gives full recognition to historical-critical investigation as 
modern scientific concept, because he regards historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) as 
something completely different. He namely distinguishes between what he 
refers to by the concepts historisch and geschichtlich (concepts which are, by 
virtue of their semantic particularity in German, “untranslatable”). He 
understands historisch as the ordinary historical factuality of an event, whereas 
geschichtlich refers to the existential consequences of such an event or to 
existence as such. In view of this distinction, Bultmann had no problem with the 
Bible’s being subjected to the sharpest and most penetrating historical criticism, 
because the matter concerned in the texts is not that which can be verified or 
falsified by means of historical investigation, but what these texts say about 
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human existence, independently of verification or falsification. The matter which 
it is really about is therefore not the historische but the geschichtliche. 
Human existence is geschichtlich and the geschicktlichkeit of the 
exegete/reader only becomes actualised in the posing of questions which 
concerns him or her and his or her existential involvement therein. In respect of 
Biblical texts, this means that the genuine historical question is determined by 
the question of the understanding one’s own existence on the basis of the 
understanding of existence expressed in the texts. The believing reader of the 
Bible is confrinted by the “non-objective subject matter” of the Biblical text and 
through this kerygmatic event the text demands unconditional obligation. 
However, it is precisely the non-objectiveness of the Biblical subject matter that 
guarantees such an unconditional demand for obedience, whereas every 
objective pronouncement always remains dubious owing to the historicity (and 
therefore falsifiability) of all traditions. 
 When the phenomena of history are interpreted as possibilities for 
understanding one’s own existence, faith remains free of bondage to the 
worldview of a particular time, and in particular that of Biblical times. This means 
that the closedness of the modern worldview is not breached. It furthermore 
implies that faith is not exchanged for a subjection of people to an old (and 
obsolete) worldview and a coerced sacrificium intellectus. The radical non-
objectiveness of the matter that the Bible is concerned with, rises above 
historical relativism; it can therefore not be endangered by the results of 
historical investigation, which are relative because they can always be 
amended. Consequently, such a “cultural-criticism” and “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” makes it impossible that faith can be understood as a static entity. 
Because the Bible’s claim for faithful obedience happens by addressing the 
believing reader in a non-objectifying manner, the kerygma does not intend to 
speak about objects but about existence. The listeners to the Biblical texts are 
addressed existentially in their Geschichtlichkeit and called upon to make a 
decision about faith, whereas the texts as historical phenomena are limitlessly 
subject to historical criticism. As mentioned above, it does not therefore bother 
Bultmann that the Bible is investigated historical-critically, because he 
understands something entirely different by geschichtlich than the matters of 
interest to historical investigation.  
 Bultmann bases the fact that he regards the Biblical addresses as non-
objective on the conviction that theology cannot make objective 
pronouncements about the Transcendental. For this reason, an objective 
statement cannot be made about God, because God would then be reduced to 
a world-thing. Pronouncements about God are only possible as anthropological 
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pronouncements, in other words as pronouncements about people and their 
existence. The Biblical texts should therefore be interpreted according to human 
beings’ self-understanding (Selbstverständnis). The texts themselves are 
witnesses of such self-understandings. Stated differently, the question should be 
asked about the human Existenzverständnis that is expressed in the texts. This 
is the essence of existential interpretation, which can also be called 
anthropological interpretation, because it always concerns anthropological 
pronouncements. This opinion of Bultmann creates the impression that God 
does not exist outside a faith-relationship. He however denies such a 
conclusion.  
 Although Bultmann, as stated above, leaned strongly towards existential 
philosophy, his theology does not become wrapped up in existential philosophy. 
It differs from existential philosophy in that the new self-understanding cannot be 
actualised by human beings themselves, but only through the mercy of God 
which comes from outside, namely by means of the addressing Word, the 
kerygma. The mercy of God is experienced in the word that is proclaimed right 
now, and the faith of the hearer is nothing else than the answer to the appealing 
word. The call of God occurs by means of a historical event, in the person of the 
human being, Jesus Christ who is proclaimed to us. It remains the mythological 
rest, the fact that God approaches us in this historical man, Jesus of Nazareth. 
With this, Bultmann holds on to the extra nos of the salvation events. But the 
kerygmatic addresses can only be heard existentially. As they do not have an 
objective nature, they cannot serve as proof for objective thinking. Conversely, 
the kerygma is not subject to historical criticism either, as historical facts are. 
The kerygma can only be adopted in faith and obedience, or be rejected. 
 The person and history of Jesus, according to Bultmann, have no 
meaning for the proclamation of the kerygma. In order to understand that Christ 
is the redeeming act of God, it is only necessary to proclaim the that of his 
coming. The that of his coming becomes a historical point without corporeality. 
Therefore Bultmann believes that the historical Jesus can be excluded from the 
proclamation. To ask about the historical Jesus behind the kerygma, is not 
intended to reinforce faith. That Jesus Christ remains the end of history, is 
remains in the world of time and space a matter which cannot be fathomed. If 
the objective pronouncements of the Bible are interpreted existentially as they 
ought to be, the worldview of the modern person is nowhere breached by 
incredible “wonders”. The radical de-objectification of the kerygmatic addresses 
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by means of existential interpretation is breached at only one point: it remains to 
have a bearing on the act of God in the that of the coming of Jesus.8  
 To Bultmann, the following are of basic importance for understanding a 
text: 
 
• Understanding proceeds from the supposition that the text will be 
questioned about the matter it is concerned with. 
 
• A further supposition of every understanding interpretation is the 
preceding (already existing) relationship to life (Lebensverhältnis) that the 
exegete/reader has with the matter which is directly or indirectly put into 
words in the text. 
 
• This life context of the matter is the basis for the pre-understanding 
(Vorverständnis) of the exegete/reader. This means that every 
interpretation is determined by the with-what-purpose (Woraufhin) of the 
question. The interest in the matter motivates the interpretation. Every 
question to the text is therefore always some or other oriented question. 
                                                     
8 Bultmann’s view on the theological relevance of the historical Jesus has often been wrongfully used to 
validate the view that a quest for the historical Jesus is “impossible”. Bultmann was prompted by Albert 
Schweitzer’s finding that exegetes who draft biographies of Jesus often project their own ideologies onto 
their images of Jesus. Such ideologies include the exegetes’ own ideas regarding ethical-religious 
perfection, goodness, sinlessness, and holiness. These are projected onto the inner being of the person 
Jesus (cf C R Joy [1948], Introduction: Schweitzer’s conception of Jesus, p 23). Bultmann called this 
“psychological fallacy”. One cannot describe another person’s mind. Earlier, Martin Kähler (1969), Der 
sogenannte historische Jesus, p 14, had already pointed out that a biography of Jesus would be 
impossible since sources did not mention Jesus’ psychological disposition. Therefore, Albert Schweitzer 
reacted against theories about supposed mental disorders in the mind of Jesus. In his doctoral thesis, 
The psychiatric study of Jesus, which served as the completion of his medical examinations, Schweitzer 
responded to the work of four “psychopathologists”. They claimed to build upon Schweitzer’s view that 
Jesus’ activities were those of a “wild” apocalyptic prophet (Schweitzer 1948:46-53; cf also A Schweitzer 
[1913], Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forchung, pp 362-367). Schweitzer’s reaction to these 
“psychopathologists” was similar to his reaction to the “liberal theologians” from the previous century. 
According to Schweitzer, they constructed a “liberalized, modernized, unreal, never existing Jesus ... to 
harmonize with [their] own ideals of life and conduct” (Joy 1948:19). In his well-known Jesus book, 
Bultmann ([1926] 1988) Jesus [Neuausgabe], pp 8-10) agrees that, “psychologically speaking” 
(psychologisch verständlich), we know virtually nothing of the “life” and “personality” of Jesus. 
Bultmann’s student, Ernst Käsemann also agrees with this. Käsemann ([1954] 1960), Das Problem des 
historischen Jesus, pp 212-213) puts it as follows: “Bei einem Leben Jesu kann man schlechterdings 
nicht auf äußere und innere Entwicklung verzichten. Von der letzten wissen wir jedoch gar nichts ....” 
But, according to Walter Schmithals (1988:149), another Bultmann-student, in the Nachwort to 
Bultmann’s Jesus book, a gross misunderstanding (“ein groteskes Mißverständnis”) could arise here. It 
is misleading to believe that Bultmann (or Schweitzer, for that matter) considered it impossible to carry 
out a historical investigation of Jesus. Bultmann (1988:13; cf also Painter 1987:102) also says that we 
know enough of Jesus’ message to be able to draw a coherent picture of him. The problem is not that 
we know too little of the historical Jesus. The question is whether this knowledge is at all relevant for 
faith. This issue nearly caused the debate between Bultmann and his students (in particular Ernst 
Käsemann and Joachim Jeremias) to become personal. Fortunately, both Käsemann and Bultmann 
declared that the matter at hand was more important than persons (see Käsemann [1964] 1969), Blind 
alleys in the “Jesus of History” controversy, p 36; and Bultmann 1965, Antwort an Ernst Käsemann, p 
190). Bultmann notes: “Denn ich bin mit Käsemann ganz darin einig, daß die Sache wichtiger ist als die 
Personen, und daß der Zusammenhalt einer Gemeinschaft, wie sie zwischen Käsemann und mir 
bestand und besteht, Spannungen ertragen muß, unter denen das persönliche Verhältnis nicht zu leiden 
braucht, − Spannungen, deren Diskussion nur zur Klärung der Sache, an der uns gelegen ist, beitragen 
kann.” 
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The Woraufhin can be identical with the intention of the text, and is then 
said directly through the text. By contrast, it can also be non-identical, 
and is then situated indirectly in the text. 
 
• The purpose of the question may be aimed at things which only indirectly 
concern the intention of the text (e.g. reconstruction of the historical facts, 
psychological, aesthetic or sociological phenomena). In respect of 
religious texts, however, the question should be aimed directly at the 
intention of the text, in other words at the understanding of human 
existence that is expressed in it. 
 
Historism had the ideal of reconstructing the historical facts without suppositions. 
Bultmann does not regard this as possible, because the actual, true meaning of 
historical events are not observable for a neutral, uninvolved observer. Here we 
can also see the influence of Kant (via Schleiermacher and Dilthey). This view 
of the “subjective” nature of historicity is often seen as an alternative to the 
view of Leopold von Rancke (1824) who describes the task of historiography 
as to establish “wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.”9 In other words, the investigator 
must (try to) reconstruct the historical situation as it really was. Experts on Von 
Rancke point out today, however, that Von Rancke did not mean the word 
“eigentlich" as historically real in the positivistic sense of the word, but 
historically essential. In this regard there is consequently no difference between 
Von Rancke and Bultmann. 
According to Bultmann, texts can only really fulfil their task as historical 
sources if they are questioned about their understanding of human existence. 
Perfect objectivity in understanding a text is not possible, however. The 
investigator is him-/herself part of history and stands to an existential 
relationship to history. The subjectivist, that is existential, interpretation is the 
most objective here. Only the question that is brought to the fore through one’s 
own existence, can hear the addresses of the text. However, subjectivity does 
not mean fantasy and arbitrariness. The existential meeting with the text has no 
other purpose than to obtain valid, objective results which can then be criticised 
and about which discussions can be held. 
Exegetes/readers cannot eliminate their pre-understanding of the matter, 
nor should they try to do so. After all, the text is mute without this pre-
understanding. However, pre-understanding must be tested critically and this 
means that in their questioning of the text, they must allow themselves to be 
questioned by the text. Their pre-understanding or preconceptions must be 
                                                     
9 See Leopold von Rancke’s ([1824] 1973), Geschichte der romanische und germanische 
Völker von 1492 bis 1535, in G C Iggers & K Von Moltke (eds), Introduction, in The theory 
and practice of history, xix-xx. 
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subjected to the correction of the text. The intention of the question to the text, 
namely to achieve Existenzverständnis, cannot however be questioned. Though 
there will always be a pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) of the life areas of 
human existence present to a lesser or greater extent among people, there 
indeed remauns the question of how something like this can exist with regard to 
the unknown God. If God, as Bultmann rightly contends, is not a worldly object, 
not part of the closed framework of human existence, how is a pre-
understanding of God possible? In response to this, Bultmann states that it is 
based on the need everyone has for God. He calls it: Das existentielle Wissen 
um Gott. This is actually existentielle Wissen um Gott (meaning the 
interpretation of “Gottes Offenbarung”); is actually in a certain sense an 
anthropological question; and to Bultmann (see again the influence of 
Schleiermacher) it is the “Frage nach der Wahrheit der menschlichen Existenz”.  
 For Bultmann there is only one way in which one can question or 
interpret the texts of the Bible regarding the matter that these texts are about, 
and that is to interpret them demythologisingly and existentially. As regards 
demythologising, his programme consists of two parts, namely a historical and a 
philological. Historically it concerns myth as a history of religion phenomenon 
which is the product of the worldview and the belief of a bygone era, a 
phenomenon which should be purged or interpreted by every exegete/reader 
according to its meaning.10 
 According to Bultmann, it is unquestionable that in the Bible, and 
therefore also in the New Testament, we are dealing with an old and mythical 
worldview, for example that the world consists of three storeys, namely heaven, 
earth and the underworld. Science has proven that this is not so and that 
modern people can no longer believe it. If modern people were still to cling to 
this old worldview (“das mythologische Weltbild”), they would have to commit a 
sacrificium intellectus. The Bible does not want to force this worldview on us, 
however, and therefore we must ask what is meant by this image. This can be 
done by demythologising. To distinguish the myth as a phenomenon in the 
history of religion is to distinguish the mythical manner of speaking about certain 
matters, such as God and the supernatural. In human language and 
representations, these things are said about as if God and the supernatural are 
part of the world. It is mythical speaking which must be interpreted, and in the 
                                                     
10 Before Bultmann, as noted above, D F Strauss in his interpretation of the New Testament 
studied in all earnestness the mythological character of the testimony of the New Testament. 
He found both the rationalist and the conservative methods of interpretation unacceptable, 
and he put the mythological in their place. He regarded the larger part of the Gospel material 
as mythical. The tales told about Jesus, especially the miracles, had all been constructed by 
the earliest church around a particular “idea” about Jesus. When interpreting these reports, 
therefore, it is not the “shape” in which the idea is cast that is important, but the idea itself that 
is expressed in it. The interpretation must therefore be aimed at reconstructing this idea. It is 
mainly ascribed to Strauss that the investigations launched after his time into the historical 
Jesus, concentrated much more on Jesus’ words than on his deeds. 
Historical consciousness and existential awareness in Karl Barth’s hermeneutics 
1390  HTS 63(4) 2007 
end it is all about the Existenzverständnis of the author(s), that is expressed in 
these representations. Demythologising envisages nothing else than to clarify 
the intention of the myth or the mythical manner of speaking, in other words, its 
intention to say something about human existence. 
 Clarifying the mythical manner of speaking also applies to the 
pronouncements about God’s actions with humankind. Like Kant and 
Schleiermacher, Bultmann does not want to objectify and humanise or reify 
God. But no one (including the writers of the Bible) can speak about God in 
anything but “objectifying language”. A mythical manner of speaking about God 
is therefore speaking objectifyingly about the actions of God (who is not an 
object) with people. All speaking about the actions of God is therefore a mythical 
manner of speaking. The actions of God cannot be objectively proven. They can 
only be experienced and seen in the effects these actions have on the 
existential involvement of human beings in them. Human beings cannot do 
anything else but speak mythically about God as Creator and Lord of nature and 
history. We have to demythologise precisely because the Christian message is 
not bound to the old worldview of the Scriptures. No worldview is final, nor 
therefore is the Biblical. The Christian message is not oriented towards 
theoretical understanding but towards “den Hörer als ein Selbst”. 
 This means that through the meeting with Christ or with the Word that 
proclaims him, the world and the history of the world will come to an end and the 
faithful will be entweltlicht as a new creation – in other words, can become 
independent of the sensory, finite world, free from the bonds of cause and effect 
in this world that determines humankind’s finiteness. So when eschatology, 
emanating from the old mythological, apocalyptic worldview, becomes 
demythologised, it no longer relates to the physical end of history and the history 
of humankind is no longer a function of world history, but lies on the other side of 
world history. In so far as the faithful are entweltlicht by their faith, they are 
already living eschatologically (with Christ) even though they are still part of 
profane history. Through their faith in Jesus Christ, human beings are already 
new human beings at every moment when they come anew to a decision about 
faith. 
 The value of Bultmann’s hermeneutic principles is seen in the fact that he 
rejected historism. The Scriptures can only be interpreted in such a way that it is 
understood as the addressing Word, as preaching. A scientific interpretation of 
the Scriptures is not without bias, because it questions the intention of the text. 
Nor can it be denied that Bultmann’s existential interpretation of the Scriptures 
placed the Biblical text in a new light and posed new challenges to faith. It 
brought the important insight that faith does not mean holding up propositions as 
given truth but that it is a living existential relationship with God; and also that 
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faith should not be seek as a habitus (a state of affairs) but invariably has to be a 
new existential experience of salvation in every moment’s decision of faith (i.e., 
to believe). Equally, it cannot be denied that Bultmann’s opinion about 
eschatology opened up new perspectives. He placed eschatological existence, 
which in reality became a Fernerwartung in the history of the church, in the 
centre of Christian life again, in the here and now. 
 The core of the criticism that was and still is levelled against Bultmann is, 
as could be expected, aimed at his demythologising programme and the fact 
that he reduces everything in the Biblical message to Existenzverständnis. 
 What became known as New Hermeneutics is linked very closely to the 
hermeneutic insights of E Fuchs and G Ebeling in the field of theology and of H-
G Gadamer in the field of philosophy. In a certain sense, this is linked to 
Bultmann’s hermeneutics and also rests to a large extent on Heidegger’s 
philosophy. 
 To Heidegger, the term hermeneutics is not an indication of the theory of 
understanding, but rather of the process of understanding itself. In this regard, 
Gadamer also states that truth cannot be obtained or achieved 
methodologically, but only dialectically. Strictly speaking, method is not able to 
reveal new truth; it only brings explicitly to the fore the kind of truth that is 
already implicitly present in the method. In method it is the investigating subject 
who takes the lead, exercises control and manipulates; in dialectics it is the 
matter with which acquaintance is made that poses the question to which the 
investigating subject responds. 
 In New Hermeneutics much emphasis is laid on the meaning and the 
power of language. For Heidegger it is, as we have seen, the Dasein (being-in-
the-world) which is itself expressed in language. People did not invent language 
and it is not the case that people express themselves in language. It is language 
itself which speaks and people are human in so far as they make room for the 
meaning that speaks, in that they respond to the speaking of meaning. People 
are where the voice of meaning is heard and finds a home. Therefore it is not 
human beings who give birth to language; on the contrary, human beings are 
born out of language. Language is not merely an instrument of communication 
among people, it is an event, it brings something into being, it is the 
establishment of meaning. 
 In junction to this, Fuchs also speaks of Sprachereignis and Ebeling of 
Wortgeschehen. Fuchs illustrates what is meant by Sprachereignis by pointing 
out that a person does not call someone “brother” simply on the basis of a 
biological fact. No, someone becomes a brother by calling him a brother. The 
relationship is confirmed by calling someone this, it becomes a reality. Language 
can then also be described as admitting, in that it allows something to enter into 
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true being. Language also assembles, brings people together. Theologically 
speaking, this means that the proclamation is a language event in that it brings 
the congregation together, brings the body of Christ into being. Fuchs and 
Ebeling therefore see language as much more than the provision of information. 
We must not ask what words contain but what they bring into being. It is 
something different for example to speak about faith than that words engender 
faith. 
 It is of the utmost importance to both Fuchs and Ebeling that the text of 
the Bible should speak anew to today’s people in order to engender faith. This 
was the way in which it originally came to its listeners. Today, so they think, too 
much faith is assumed and the proclamation becomes merely a repetition of 
what is traditionally believed. But how can the text be brought to the point where 
it speaks anew to the people of today? The text must be translated for the 
people of today. This, however, does not mean that the original words can be 
repeated without further ado. Simply repeating the original words may mean that 
they say absolutely nothing to people in their present circumstances. 
 For this reason, Ebeling states that the same word of the text can only be 
said in an intelligible way for another time if it is said differently. We have already 
pointed out that a text from the past spoke in the text’s own historical framework 
with everything it comprised, and that it can only be made intelligible in another 
framework by taking into account the conditions for understanding that the new 
framework requires. This requirement is a gravely serious matter for New 
Hermeneutics. Not only must the matter of the text be brought to speech, the 
place must also be found where this matter can address one today. 
Hermeneutics is for New Hermeneutics the theory of understanding, not a 
collection of rules. Yet it is not solely about hermeneutics as a theory but as the 
practice of making understanding possible. Hermeneutics does not say what is 
understood, but is an aid to bringing understanding about. According to Ebeling, 
hermeneutics is really only necessary where something impedes the speaking 
of the text with the result that it cannot be understood. The text (or word) has 
itself a hermeneutic function. If the word-events occur normally, they need no 
aid to be understood, but are themselves an aid to understanding. 
 We have already pointed out that Bultmann believes that an essential 
assumption for understanding is the preceding life-relationship and life context of 
the exegete/reader with regard to the matter the text is concerned with. More or 
less in concurrence with this, Fuchs states that it is essential for the 
exegete/reader to be involved (beteiligt) in order to make a conversation 
possible, and therefore to make understanding possible. He calls this 
involvement Einverständnis. It is the willingness to become involved, the 
establishment and presence of a common ground for the conversation. He 
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illustrates this involvement or common/mutual understanding (comprehension) 
on the basis of the situation in a home (family). “At home one does not speak so 
that people may understand, but because people understand.” It is also clear 
from this that for Fuchs the use of language is not as much about the content of 
words but more about the language event. He states that the importance of the 
principle of Einverständnis can be seen in the words of Jesus, especially in the 
parables. Jesus made use, especially in the parables, of language through 
which He involved his listeners, by using familiar images and examples from 
everyday life. Through Einverständnis the horizons of the worlds of speaker and 
hearer meet each other and they merge to bring into existence a common world 
or terrain of understanding. Through this, a new world arises, and through this 
new world people’s old world is changed and their old norms and preferences 
are brought to an end. An example of this can also be clearly detected in the 
parables. The parables create a new world for the listeners in which they find 
that the roles have been inverted and that their previous convictions and 
judgements are shown to be useless or wrong, and they are brought to different 
insights. Now they have to decide or choose in a completely new situation. 
 We have already commented that various people engaged in the 
hermeneutic question have stated that there is no possibility of any question of 
presuppositionless exegesis. This is also the conviction of New Hermeneutics. 
The principle of the so-called empty head is therefore rejected as naïve and 
absurd. Besides the fact that exegetes/readers form part of a historical reality 
which determines their actions and from which they cannot free themselves or 
think independently. New Heremeneutics’ point of departure is the fact that 
communication supposes a dialogical relation. This essentially sounds like 
something paradoxical, namely that that which must be understood, must 
already be known. Because exegetes/readers are part of a historical tradition, it 
is inevitable that prejudices (Vorurteile) will be present among them. Gadamer 
asserts that these prejudices of the individual, rather than his or her judgements, 
are the historical reality of his or her existence. Being aware of these prejudices 
that are based on the historical and cultural sphere in which exegetes/readers 
find themselves, they are however also aware of the distance in time and 
circumstances between their time and the time in which the text originated. Only 
if exegetes/readers are aware of this distance, can they extend the horizon of 
their world until it merges with that of the text. Only then is Einverständnis 
possible and so a dialogue of question and answer between the exegete/reader 
and the text can arise. But this does not mean that the exegete/reader may be 
blind to what has already been built up traditionally around the text and which 
may obstruct access to the text. Exegetes/readers must also be able to distance 
themselves from all traditional interpretations which do not do justice to the text. 
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 In New Hermeneutics, too, an inversion of the subject-object-scheme 
occurs. Here, too, the text is seen as the real subject and the exegete/reader as 
the object. According to Fuchs, the truth has ourselves as object and the text 
has first to translate us before we can translate the text. The text sheds light on 
the experiential world of exegetes/readers and helps them to understand it. It 
has already become clear from what has so far come to the fore from the 
insights of New Hermeneutics that for this approach, too, the process of 
understanding takes place in a circular course between exegete/reader and text, 
the so-called hermeneutic circle. Exegetes/readers go to the text with their 
preliminary questions. Their questions will probably not be correct in all respects, 
but the text has its turn to speak and shed light on their particular situation. They 
are hereby enabled to put their questions differently or to formulate them better, 
and the more appropriate their questions, the more understandable and clearer 
are the text’s answers to the questions. In this way the exegete/reader is 
invariably better enabled not only to put questions to the text about the matter 
concerned, but the voice of this subject matter also speaks more strongly and 
clearly into the situation of the exegete/reader. 
 And this is in the essence of hermeneutics: the text from the past must 
speak anew in the present, in today’s situation. It must interpret the present, 
shed light on the here and now, and in so doing become a speaking event in the 
present. In this way, the language of the text makes existence an event. At this 
point we think again about Fuchs’s view that the exegete’s / reader’s self-
understanding is the aim of the hermeneutic process. 
 Some of the most important points of criticism against the approach of 
New Hermeneutics are the following: 
 
• Although New Hermeneutics focuses on a “deeper understanding” of the 
text, it is not as strongly attuned to understanding the text correctly. This 
objection rests mainly on the view that New Hermeneutics reduces the 
historical-critical activity to a mere preliminary stage of exegesis, so 
justice cannot be fully done to it in the whole process of interpretation. 
This dilution of the historical-critical investigation is seen as the result of a 
too-biased inversion of the subject-object scheme, through which the 
exegete/reader becomes too much of a listener and does not look 
critically enough at the text to make sure that what he or she hears, is 
really the truth in respect of what the text wants to say. The 
exegetes/readers are thus too passive and there is a great danger that 
what they hear will not be the intention of the text. By not approaching the 
text critically enough, it may happen that the language event or speaking 
event becomes completely meaningless.  
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• Furthermore, New Hermeneutics is accused of using the New Testament 
selectively. Emphasis is given to sections such as psalms, confessions 
and parables in which the speech event comes strongly to the fore, 
whereas argumentative sections do not get much attention. Sections of 
the New Testament that appear to New Hermeneutics to be early patristic 
tradition are similarly pushed aside. It is pointed out to New Hermeneutics 
that it is precisely the theological tradition already present in the New 
Testament that is proof that the text of the New Testament is aimed not 
only at unbelievers but also at people who have already professed their 
faith and have stood in the tradition of faith. This means that the New 
Testament text is therefore not only aimed at creating faith as language-
event, but also at sustaining already existing faith. 
 
• A third point of criticism concerns the view that New Hermeneutics has 
about language. The objection is that, as among primitive tribes, a 
magical character is accorded to language and language is placed on a 
par with the reality of being itself, something which it simply is not. 
Although language does indeed give shape to the way in which a 
community observes and orders reality, the use of language rests on the 
other hand, on a number of rules and customs of the community that 
employs the language. The word itself is not a thing but only a symbol or 
sign indicating the thing. The power that New Hermeneutics assigns to 
language therefore leads to serious attention been given only to 
imperative, directive language, whereas descriptive or informative 
language is ignored. This rests on the conviction that the real nature of 
words is not enclosed in what they contain, but in the effect that they 
have. This view of New Hermeneutics is criticised on the basis that 
descriptive or informative language cannot be rejected as having no value 
for faith. 
 
• Conservative theologians in particular have objections to the way in 
which New Hermeneutics goes about the Selbstverständnis of the 
exegete/reader. The objection rests on the conviction that New 
Hermeneutics makes what is true for the exegete/reader, the criterion for 
what is true. A view such as this, it is thought, reduces theology to a 
voluntary human-centred matter which depends on the subjective 
judgement of the exegete/reader. Everyone can then simply understand 
as he or she wishes, and this is set on a par with what the text wants to 
say. Together with this criticism, the hermeneutic circle also comes under 
fire. The principle of the hermeneutic circle, so it is alleged, places the 
text and the experience of the exegete/reader in an untenable common 
relationship to each other, as if the two were on the same level. 
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• The inversion of the subject-object scheme by New Hermeneutics and 
the emphasis placed on the imperative that justice must be done to the 
text, and that exegetes/readers should not transfer their ideas to the text, 
as may happen in the traditional subject-object approach, is regarded as 
one-sided. The opinion is that this one-sidedness does not allow New 
Hermeneutics to do justice to the inevitable necessity that the text 
nevertheless must be researched as object or subject of investigation. 
There is essential knowledge or information that can only be obtained in 
this way, and this aspect of the endeavour to understand may not be 
neglected or negated. 
 
7. KARL BARTH’S LEGACY 
From the description of the influence that the Aufklärung of the nineteenth-
century had on twentieth-century theologians, it has in my view become clear 
that especially two of the insights that came to the fore in hermeneutic 
consideration during the second half of the nineteenth century figured 
prominently in the twentieth century. This can be seen not only in the thoughts of 
Bultmann (and the exponents of the so-called New Hermeneutics) but also in 
those of Karl Barth. 
 It cocerns namely in the first place the distinction that Dilthey draws 
between understanding in the human sciences and explaining in the natural 
sciences; but then also the inversion of the subject-object scheme. To the 
natural sciences it is a matter of course that investigators as subjects put 
questions to the object of their investigation, as object, and in this way try to 
master the object. In hermeneutics the conviction has however taken hold that in 
the process of understanding a text, this subject-object scheme cannot continue 
to be maintained. Here the investigator (reader) is not the subject but the object, 
and vice versa. He or she must as object listen to what the text as subject has to 
say to him or her. 
 In a debate with Adolf von Harnack11 (1851-1930) who still advocated the 
natural science subject-object scheme, also for the interpretation of the 
Scriptures, Barth stated that it should be remembered that the Biblical text as 
object was first (and the first) subject, and that it must always be the subject 
again. It is therefore the object that now, as subject, puts questions to the 
subject, now the object. This questioning not only applies to the formal level, 
namely whether the exegete asks the right questions, but also the material level, 
                                                     
11 See, e.g., A von Harnack [1999], Das Wesen des Christentums, herausgegeben und 
kommentiert von T Rendtorff. 
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namely the question as to whether the text’s answers enlighten the exegete, in 
other words whether the exegete understands his or her own existence in the 
same way as the text understands existence. 
 Barth himself did not produce a worked-out hermeneutic theory, but he 
did say enough in his foreword(s) to his commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans and in his other publications to give us a good impression of his 
thoughts in this regard. His view of the Scriptures must be taken as the point of 
departure for the question of his hermeneutic views. He approaches the 
Scriptures as an analogy of the person of Christ who through his incarnation 
united God and man in Himself. This implies that against the backdrop of the 
incarnation the Scriptures are to be understood as a unity of God’s Word and 
humankind’s word. Both are significant. The Word of God is distinguished from 
the word of humankind but is at the same time one with the word of humankind. 
There is a relationship of indirect identity between the human Scriptural word 
and the revelatory Word of God.12 In other words, although the human word is 
not identical with God’s Word, God speaks to us in this concrete human word, 
not behind it or next to it or in a sphere which we still have to discover. 
 But the testimony of the Bible is not itself the matter about which it 
testifies, since it is only the human testimony of it. And yet it is in this human 
word that God addresses us. God says now what this text says here; God’s 
work takes place through this text. The text can therefore only be heard in the 
actual obedience to this addressing by God, and in faith’s expectation that God 
will in God’s freedom reveal God’s Word to us. This is theological exegesis. To 
Barth, theological exegesis implies that the reader of the Old and New 
Testament will remember that the church has until now heard the Word of God 
in this book, and that the church will have the expectation of itself hearing the 
Word of God here in the present situation. Theological exegesis is located 
between this remembrance and expectation. 
 Barth could not reconcile himself to the purely historical-critical 
investigation of the Scriptures. In his foreword to the first edition of his 
commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, he states that if he had to choose 
between the historical-critical method and the old doctrine of inspiration, he 
would choose the latter. However, he does not regard it as necessary to make a 
choice, since historical investigation is to him the preparation for understanding 
the text. We must read the Bible historically, but in such a way that we 
understand what it is about. All interpretation must be guided by the matter that 
the text is about. The gap between the Bible and our understanding of it is, 
                                                     
12 See inter alia G Plasger (2000), Die relative Autorität des Bekenntnisses bei Karl Barth, esp 
pp 9-30. 
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however, just as vast as that between human understanding and God. For this 
reason, this gap can only be bridged by the Spirit. The word of God given 
through the Spirit, can only be understood with the help of the Spirit. God can 
only be known through God. According to Barth, it is the intention “durch das 
Historische hindurch zu sehen in den Geist der Bibel, der der ewige Geist ist”. 
 Barth with all emphasis regarded the pneumatic dimension as the 
conditio sine qua non for understanding the Bible. The Spirit’s communicating of 
the Word of God is, however, in a certain sense independent of all ordinary 
processes of human comprehension. One can namely only be confronted and 
illuminated by the Word of God as truth and reality if it is seen as contrary to 
humans’ whole natural ability to understand. Barth therefore wants the Bible to 
be read, understood and interpreted historically. But he rejected what he 
regarded as the problem of historism in the historical-critical paradigm, namely 
that the historical realities or “facts” behind the text are seen as the things in 
which revelation is contained, instead of seeing revelation as contained in the 
text itself. In his opinion, in historism the emphasis is placed on the Bible’s 
historical situation at the expense of its theological message. He wanted to link 
the study of the historical background of the Bible up with the interpretation of its 
theological message. 
 In short, Barth wanted the text’s Sitz im Leben to correlate with the text’s 
Sitz im Wort, with the emphasis on the latter. To him, it was not only about a 
question of the pious mood of the Biblical author but also the matter concerned, 
and that is the testimony of the revelation of God. Barth replaced the religious 
person with the revelation of God. He set the total otherness of God against the 
religious optimism of Liberal Theology and its opinion about the camaraderie 
between God and humankind. Revelation is to him that process in which it 
pleases the sovereign God to make God self known to humankind. God is not a 
human being, not even a perfect human being. The human being must know his 
or her place, and that is to wait on the revelation of God. This does not mean 
that human beings must passively await this revelation, but the fact is that 
people do not have any control over it. Nor to Barth can there be something like 
presuppositionless exegesis (voraussetzungslose Exegese). The exegete 
cannot initially approach the text neutrally to analyse it historically-
psychologically and only then listen to the Word of God. 
 There are not two stages in exegesis, there is only one truth. Therefore 
there cannot be another reality underlying the text before asking about the 
matter itself. For this reason, Barth rejects the so-called “pneumatic exegesis” as 
a second stage, and therefore the hermeneutic dualism of “scientific” and 
“practical” interpretation. Through this he reclaims the inner unity of the 
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interpretation of the Scriptures. Barth also rejects the intention fallacy. The text 
and the author are not the same thing. Even if we had access to what the author 
might have meant to say, it still would not enable us to understand everything 
that the text might currently mean for the present reader. The meaning of the 
text does not lie in the historical realities of the author’s intention behind the text, 
but in the language-specific realities that are at issue in the text. Barth was 
furthermore of the opinion that the Biblical text, and therefore every text, does 
not possess a specific meaning which only has to be extracted from it (the so-
called Cinderella fallacy). Yet, the Bible is not wholly unstable as a radically 
acentric différance. It is indeed an open and diffuse intertext, but the meaning of 
the Bible is not for ever played on a bottomless chessboard without boundaries 
or limits. On the other hand, readers never have a guarantee that they have 
reflected the intention of the text correctly. It is only the promise of the Spirit’s 
presence in the process of interpretation that makes the true transference of the 
Biblical content possible. 
 In conclusion, it was clear to Barth that there could not be anything like 
“Biblical” hermeneutics in contradistinction to “profane” hermeneutics. Therefore 
there is no such thing as a “sacred” compared to a “profane” way of 
understanding. Some of the winning points of Barth’s hermeneutics are that he 
made the text the subject of communication events, that he emphasised the 
matter concerned in the text and rejected the intention fallacy, the double 
meaning of the Scriptures and presuppositionless exegesis, and lastly that he 
saw that there was no such thing as a fixed, given meaning of a text. The most 
important misgiving, however, remains Barth’s negative attitude towards 
historical criticism and as a result, his reading of things into texts which could not 
withstand the test of historical investigation. Barth’s Christological analogy for 
explaining the relationship between God’s Word and the human word in the 
Bible is more inventive than convincing. 
 Not only did Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic arch idea offer a corrective to 
Barth’s unconvincing application of the hermeneutic circle, it was also shown 
to be biased, especially through the critical theory of the so-called Frankfurt 
School. In this regard, Jürgen Habermas played a significant role. Critical 
theory was in fact meant as an alternative to the traditional hermeneutic 
approach of someone like Barth. The consensus principle (merging of 
horizons) was not unquestioningly accepted without further ado (see Klemm 
1986:203-208). This hermeneutic approach proceeds from the assumption 
that a “merging of the horizons” occurs in the communicative interaction 
between subject and object and that an exchange of roles occurs at the same 
time. Object is subject. An illustration of the problem is that if the object has 
for example internalised pain owing to system relations, an exchange of roles 
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cannot of itself entail that the experience of pain is recognised and identified 
as a problem. On the contrary, precisely because the object which is the 
bearer of pain now gains the status of subject, the possibility of recognition 
becomes even further obscured.  
 This is an example of the problematics surrounding the concept of “role 
exchanging” in Barth’s hermeneutics, in spite of his having had a dynamic 
perspective on the Scriptures. We have seen that to him the Bible was not in 
the direct sense of the word equal to God’s revelation. Otto Weber (1967:16) 
points out that the Bible only became Revelation to Barth “wo das Bibelwort 
als Zeugenwort in Funktion tritt.” One can only then speak of God’s revelation 
when the Bible is heard in word events: “Sie muß Gottes Wort je und je 
werden.” Such “events” (Ereignis) can be seen as erfüllte Zeit which mit Jesus 
Christus identisch ist. The problem lies, however, in the possibility that this 
dynamic view of the Scriptures may become enervated if it does not touch 
ground existentially. For this reason, the comment that H Zahrnt makes in his 
book Die Sache mit Gott, should be taken to heart. Zahrnt13 criticised Barth’s 
theology because it often came across as “Monolog im Himmel”. It seems to 
me that this can be ascribed to the fact that the role exchanging “subject-
object” was not in essence for Barth a subject-subject relationship, but was 
still in the converse sense of the word a subject-object relationship. For Barth 
the Biblical text is the object first (and the first) subject and always has to 
become the subject again. It is therefore the object that now as subject, puts 
questions to the subject, now the object. For this reason, Barth can without 
reservations speak of the “Freiheit des Wortes”, without becoming aware that 
when God’s Word is communicated in a word event, the existing distorted 
communication in the Scriptures – because of explicit of sublimed 
patriarchalism or, among other things, gender inequality or the abuse of power 
– can be conveyed as normative. 
Because God’s Word (the subject) has a “freedom” which people (the 
object) cannot place in bonds, Barth speaks in terms of “power” when he 
refers to the "authority" of the Scriptures. The insight into the fact that 
communication can be distorted by the search for one’s own interest in power, 
dawned only in the post-Aufklärung era. In my opinion, discounting any abuse 
of power in the Biblical discourse is a condition for really speaking of 
communication on a subject-subject axis. Something of the breakthrough that 
this insight made in the hermeneutic approach can in fact be seen in Hans-
Georg Gadamer. When Gadamer ([1990] 1999), the pioneer of the new 
hermeneutic approach, applies the hermeneutic circle concept (i.e. the 
concept of “role exchanging”) to the interaction with the Bible, he sees that 
                                                     
13 H Zahrnt ([1966] 1967), Die Sache mit Gott: Die protestantische Theologie im 20. 
Jahrhundert, p 141. 
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being subjected to the Bible should not be an issue of dominance on the part 
of the Bible but rather as a matter of serving. 
In the postmodern discourse of thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, 
Theodor W Adorno and Michel Foucault,14 the emphasis does not lie as such 
on understanding, but on experiencing. They recognise it as a problem in 
communication when “objects” are reified or reduced to superficiality owing to 
objectivising it to non-identity and experiencing it as painful. This critical 
hermeneutics has as goal the emancipatory cognitive interest. This “interest” 
wants to promote and encourage a society free from distorted communication 
which conveys the abuse of power through totalitarianism. The words 
“promote” and “encourage” are important here. Sometimes the likes of 
Habermas is criticised for the fact that his critical theory would essentially be a 
utopia, because in this broken world a condition of ideal egalitarianism could 
never be attained. 
However, critical theory is in this regard different from classical 
Marxism.15 In fact, it originated within the neo-Marxist school that criticised 
Marx’s idea of a classless society. Critical theory does promote and 
encourage the ideal of non-manipulation and exploitation.16 By means of this 
critical theory, people are made aware that the ideal has not been actualised. 
That is why critical theory calls on people to be continuously, in all societies, 
critically attuned to manipulation and exploitation.17 In the words of Jacques 
Derrida18 (concurring with both Immanuel Kant’s idea of the categorical 
imperative and Emmanuel Levinas’ idea of the infinite responsibility): 
 
How, then, are we to interpret this impossibility [of establishing a 
seemingly symmetrical discourse] …. Does this impossibility signal 
a failing? Perhaps we should say the contrary. Perhaps we would, 
in truth, be put to another kind of test by the apparent negativity of 
this lacuna, this hiatus between ethics …, on the one hand, and, on 
                                                     
14 See, e.g., E Levinas ([1982] 2006), Bible and philosophy, [and] Responsibility for the Other, [and] The 
hardness of philosophy and the consolation of religion, in Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe 
Nemo, tr by R A Cohen, 19-34, [and] 93-102, [and] 111-122 (cf G A Phiilips 2000, s v Levinas, in, A K M 
Adam ed, Handbook of postmodern Biblical interpretation, 154-159); T Adorno ([1967] 1981), Prisms, tr 
by Samuel & Shierry Weber (cf C J Beukes 1996, Anderbereddering: Met Adorno by die hartslag van 
die post moderne intellek, 68-87); M Foucault ([1969] 1972), Archaeology of knowledge (cf M K George 
2000, s v Foucault, in Adam, A K M ed, Handbook of postmodern Biblical interpretation, 91-98). 
 
15 See, e.g., H Hoefnagels ([1974] 1976), Kritische sociologie: Inleiding tot het sociologisch 
denken der “Frankfurter Schule”. 
 
16 Seem e.g. N Adams (2006), Habermas and theology. Cambridge, pp 106-123.  
 
17 See, e.g., A Wellmer (1976), Communication and emancipation: Reflections on the 
linguistic turn of critical theory, in J O’Neill (ed), On critical theory, 231-263.  
 
18 J Derrida ([1997] 1999, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, tr by P-A Brault & M Naas, pp 20-21 
(cf Hent de Vries 2001, Derrida and ethics: Hospitable thought, in T Cohen (ed), Jacques 
Derrida and the humanities: A critical reader, 172-192). 
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the other, law or politics … Would it not in fact open – like a hiatus – 
both the mouth and the possibility of another speech, of a decision 
and a responsibility … where decisions must be made and 
responsibility, as we say, taken without the assurance of an 
ontological foundation? (Derrida’s emphasis). 
 
This standpoint links up theologically with the perspective of a person such as 
the apostle Paul. Paul always goes from the indicative of salvation and calls 
the faithful to become what they already are. Therefore there is always an 
imperative; although salvation is proclaimed, it is in this broken world only 
audible to the ear of faith. Paul, from the perspective of the salvationary 
indicative, proclaims that there is no man or woman in Christ. Here, in the 
postmodern sense, one finds the ideal of “egalitarian symmetry”. In today’s 
context, hermeneutics ought to have this ideal high on the list of priorities by 
promoting and encouraging it in any communication and interaction.  
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